Israel’s Attack on Hezbollah’s Communications Network Is Not the Victory It Claims

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Israel’s Attack on Hezbollah’s Communications Network Is Not the Victory It Claims

Israel has not claimed responsibility for the rolling “pager attack” in Lebanon. Israeli social discourse, however, is not even debating the issue. It is clear that “we did it” (exclamation point optional). What is it that we actually did? One can surmise that Israeli intelligence established a company that produced pagers and walkie-talkies and managed to pique Hezbollah’s interest in these devices. Hezbollah prides itself on its low-tech approach to communications, assuming that this makes its network impenetrable. The company that produced these devices inserted a small quantity of explosives into each one. Hezbollah made a large purchase and very recently delivered the devices to thousands of its personnel. Soon afterward, someone or something sent a message to all the devices, which reportedly heated them up and caused them to explode. A second wave of explosions shook Lebanon on the following day. Thousands of devices exploded. Thousands were wounded, hundreds critically. More than 30 people are reported to have died, including a 9-year-old girl.

What was the plan? I doubt there was a plan. Israel enjoys complete intelligence superiority over its regional enemies — even if it missed the Oct. 7 Hamas attack. We can assume that Israel also has complete tactical superiority over Hezbollah. Israel has been operating in Lebanon for decades, mostly from the air but also on the ground, via commando operations (not all of which are authorized) and by running a massive network of intelligence operatives. Israeli knowledge is accurate enough to assassinate a senior Hamas leader in his Beirut apartment. It is reasonable to assume that Israel penetrated Hezbollah’s intelligence array and perhaps even its purchasing department. This may seem like an incredible achievement, but the key word here is “tactical.” Israel can mount elaborate, highly impressive operations that end up with extremely specific results. Another example is the theft of the “nuclear archives” from Tehran. Israel identified a storage facility, carried out lengthy and detailed operational planning, and then stole CDs and documents and brought them back to Israel. Does anyone remember a significant effect this operation had on regional or global strategy with regard to the Iranian nuclear program? No. Israel identified a target and had the ability to approach and overtake this target. Israel did it and hoped for the best. This, to the best of my understanding, is the dominant rationale for this operation.

Another potential reason for this attack is Israeli officialdom’s desperate need for another war. Israel evacuated tens of thousands of citizens from its north in the immediate aftermath of the Oct. 7 massacre. The reason? An assumption, grounded in the conspiracy theory that shapes Israeli regional security thought, that the Hamas attack was orchestrated by Iran and a similar attack by Hezbollah would be sure to follow. This was a doomsday scenario. This evacuation sentenced tens of thousands to a nomadic life and a large part of Israel to economic shutdown. With the residents gone, Hezbollah and Israel began an escalating exchange of fire. Nearly one year later, the north of Israel is still depopulated and is now uninhabitable.

This appears to have been a miscalculation. Since Oct. 7, the Israeli military has spoken of nothing but a war in Lebanon as the “solution.” This has been the dominant strain of opinion within professional circles since early November 2023. What might be achieved with such a war? Israel might be able to push Hezbollah across the Litani River, forcing it to remain at least 3 miles from the Israeli border. Those canvassing for a war, however, make arguments quite similar to the war goals Israel established in Gaza, most prominently the “destruction of Hezbollah as an organization.” The goal of destroying Hamas “as an organization” remains unfulfilled in Gaza, if only because no one can establish with any clarity what this means. Think of the famous conversation between Alice and the Cheshire cat:

“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?”
“That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” said the Cat.
“I don’t much care where — ” said Alice.
“Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,” said the Cat.

The effective meaning of “the destruction of Hamas,” and with it “the destruction of Hezbollah,” is endless war. Famously “the province of uncertainty,” Israel’s military leadership turns to war as the only source of certainty left. When Israel fights, Israelis can be certain that their actions are inevitable. Israel has no benchmarks defining triumph and defeat. That may be optimal because Israel does not know where it wants to go. Indeed, Israel’s best chance of remaining vital is to remain in motion, and the only option of doing that in Israel’s current predicament is to remain at war.

Yet Israel is afraid of starting a war. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is walking a fine line between public disdain for him personally and the broad consensus that supports a war. Most Israelis suspect Netanyahu of wanting a war to maintain his hold on power, to further his campaign against Israel’s democratic institutions and to avoid legal prosecution for the many serious corruption charges he is currently battling. If he positions himself as the main instigator and promoter of the war, that will immediately shape how it’s viewed by the Israeli public. Additionally, Netanyahu and his military leadership are fully aware of Israel’s failure in Gaza. Military discipline is at an all-time low, as can be seen by the seemingly uncountable and well-publicized incidents in Gaza, like the slaying of the World Central Kitchen humanitarian workers, which was authorized by a regimental commander in direct contravention of orders from division headquarters. The Israeli economy is already imploding and is expected to worsen within the year. There is a major difference between embarking on an unchecked rampage in Gaza on Oct. 7, 2023, and starting a war in Lebanon in September 2024. This is why Netanyahu must have Hezbollah start this war. When this happens, Netanyahu will be able to blame Iran, and this accusation will, in turn, allow him to insinuate that Israel’s horrific campaign in Gaza was also a necessity in the face of a fanatic enemy’s desire to destroy Israel. The pager attack was, undoubtedly, related to this state of affairs.

Before we consider the repercussions of Israel’s attack, a third rationale suggests itself, and it is the most mundane of all. The ability to detonate these devices must have had an expiration date. Israel planned this operation for months, maybe for years, but it could not risk losing the effect of yet another tactical success. Tactics are Israel’s only remaining meal ticket. This is in no way unprecedented; even Israel’s July assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran was most likely committed not to send any kind of strategic message, but simply because Haniyeh was foolish enough to leave Qatar and was therefore exposed. Israel has a tactical mindset. Such considerations are often paramount in the Israeli decision-making process.

What are the potential repercussions of this attack? There are several. First, it will likely strengthen Hezbollah’s Lebanese credentials in ways not too different from previous Israeli incursions into Lebanon. There is a never-ending but pointless discussion about whether Hezbollah is more Iranian or more Lebanese. Hezbollah is very close to Iran, just as it is Lebanese through and through, not an uncommon state of affairs on the Lebanese political scene. The terrible images from Lebanon, the reports from overflowing emergency rooms, the hundreds who were critically injured — all these inspired a general sense of fear and alarm in the entire population of Lebanon. This attack was perceived as a violation of Lebanese sovereignty at the deepest, most intimate level, as a violation of personal space. This attack, carried out with no precautions or limitations, put all Lebanese at risk. While there are those who blame Hezbollah for foisting this threat on the country, many more consider themselves victims alongside the injured and dead Hezbollah personnel. Israelis are completely oblivious to this dimension of the attack, expressing smug joy at having “outsmarted them” again. The year of war in Gaza has convinced many Israelis that what they had always felt but were embarrassed to say was true — ultimately “they” all want to kill Jews and therefore deserve death. The impact of this violation, the scope of this attack, the sense of unity it brings to an already battered Lebanese society — none of these register in Israel.

A second repercussion has to do with the widening implications of this attack at an international level. Israel’s annihilation of Gaza can be, and still is, viewed by many through the traditional filter of “war.” Hamas attacked and Israel retaliated, with questions of scope and intensity to be decided later by the proper authorities. The pager attack indicates a crossing of several lines into what is very much a gray area. This attack flirts with terrorism, or at the very least with very clear violations of international humanitarian law. It also introduces fear and suspicion into areas once perceived as beyond such intrusions — the dynamics of the free market and the global chain of production and dissemination. These are taken much more seriously than sectarian or regional conflicts and are seen as relevant for every person all over the world. No one is safe if this can be done so easily, and while enough international players identify Hezbollah with terrorism, who’s to say what the next stage might be? Israel has sown the wind and the world expects to reap the whirlwind.

Will this attack affect a war that may be fought between Israel and Lebanon? I doubt it. While the attack debilitated parts of Hezbollah’s chain of command, Hezbollah is a stable organization, ready for emergencies. Should a war begin, Hezbollah will be able and willing. But must a war begin? Is one inevitable? I would cautiously propose that it is not. Israeli propaganda is committed to casting Hezbollah (and Iran) as motivated by considerations of honor above all else. Both Hezbollah and Iran have repeatedly demonstrated throughout the past year that this is not the case. In an unusual turn of events, Israel has gone rogue while Hezbollah and Iran stand for restraint and cooperation, something even U.S. officials have said in private. The pager attack may be the harbinger of all-out war, but it may also be the day Israel overstepped its unspoken boundaries, demonstrating to the world that it considers itself beyond the reach of any and all rules of engagement. Even war will not make the memory of this attack recede.

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